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Method for Theory:
A Prelude to Human Ecosystems

H.E. KUCHKA

INSCRIPTION ON A BRIDGE AT THE SUMMER PALACE OF THE FORMER EMPERORS OF CHINA
THERE ARE THREE MONKEYS WHO CANNOT SEE THEIR FACES.
THERE IS A BRIDGE BUT NO WATER.
THERE ARE WINDOWS BUT THEY DO NOT OPEN.
THERE IS A TABLET BUT NO WORDS.
THERE IS A MIRROR BUT YOU CANNOT SEE YOUR FACE.
THERE IS A GATE BUT NO ONE PASSES THROUGH.

Truth in Advertising:
The following essay is a somewhat twisted mimicry of Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994.
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Preface
This two-part essay represents the product of an exercise in developing method for theory, beginning
Fall 1999 in the Complex Systems II graduate seminar in the Department of Anthropology at the
University of Georgia. It was motivated by dissatisfaction with both the understanding and practice of
theory building presently available in ecological anthropology. We sought to integrate an expansive
approach to method-for-theory with our developing human ecosystems perspective.
We needed a strong method-for-theory to provide a common framework for our diverse interests
in human ecosystems. Ecological Understanding (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994) was chosen as the
model exposition. As a guiding model it is an excellent place to begin. Cleverly done, well organized,
easy to read, it misses very little about the nature of theory relevant to biological ecology. Our immediate goal was to rework its structure and content in the service of human ecology, particularly to enhance
our approach to human ecosystems.
The author of this essay is given as H. E. Kuchka. H. E. is the abbreviation for Human Ecosystems. Kuchka is the group.1 This moniker was inspired in part by the character and creative spirit of
the late 19th Century musical study group in Russia that included Rimsky-Korsakov, known in the
West as the Mighty Five. Our group’s ultimate goal is to establish a truly anthropological understanding of human ecosystems, drawing upon a broad range of human variation and historical
perspectives, while at the same time adapting the compositional techniques and scholastic backgrounds of other, more mature, ecological disciplines.

Felice S. Wyndham, Guest Editor

1

In this production it was Felice S. Wyndham, Eric C. Jones, Mitchell A. Pavao-Zuckerman, Suzanne E. Joseph, Rebecca
K. Zarger and Charles R. Peters, with contributions from David G. Casagrande, John R. Stepp and Warren P. Roberts.
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INTRODUCTION:
INTEGRATION IN
HUMAN ECOLOGY
Two themes will be addressed throughout this
essay. The first is that there is both a need and an
opportunity for greater integration in the discipline
of human systems ecology. The second is that the
tools are already available to achieve greater integration, especially if it is recognized that human
ecosystems are predominantly evolving and dynamic information-ecosystems. Our task here is
to conceptually explore the implications of this
realization, in search of a broader understanding
of the nature of human ecosystems. But first we
must lay out a framework for the development of
theory in the service of disciplinary integration.
Toward this goal, this essay is divided into two main
sections. The first section is concerned with the
methods and rationale for developing integrative
theory in human ecology. The second section applies these methods to sketching some of the components of a nascent theory of human ecosystems,
our initial working experiment in the utility of disciplinary integration in human ecology.
The task of understanding humans has traditionally been rather strictly divided. The humanities study the informational aspects of human societies–art, religion, literature, history–while biologists and a few ecologists and anthropologists tackle
physical, medical, behavioral and cognitive components. We propose that to begin to understand
human systems, a human ecology paradigm2 must
be developed that integrates these two historical
trajectories. The discipline of anthropology has
been at the intersection of these two trajectories
since its conception and is thus a good place to
prescribe the radical integration of sociocultural
ecology and biophysical ecology.

2
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To get a feel for what an integrated human
ecology might look like we offer the following introductory preview. After examining each on its
own, try to look simultaneously at the four graphical conceptualizations of human systems presented
in Figures 1a through 1d. The goal of this exercise
is to promote the kind of radical synthesis needed
for a truly integrated human ecology. Each of these
models adds unique conceptual constructs and
graphic representations of the problems and potentials of the human condition.
H. T. Odum’s model (Figure 1a) abstractly
delineates the actors in the system of interest, the
relevant flow of energy, and depicts the concept of
energy upgrading across the subsystems. Forrester
(Figure 1b) is more successful at depicting the information network, the cumulative effect of flows
and their informational triggers. Larkin’s chart of
the Christian spirit world (Figure 1c) is composed
of highly abstracted (moral) relations and flows
between supernaturals and humans in a metaphysical universe. Depicting a particular belief system
at a particular time and place in history, this figure
is a good diagrammatic example of the kind of informational systems that humans create and operate within. Robins’ model (Figure 1d), inspired by
the Church of the Subgenius, presents surreal
graphic narrative, a postmodern belief system in
perverse parallel to Larkin’s Christian representation of the spiritual universe. Robins uses traditional and postmodern techniques, such as humor
and confronting the strangeness of the familiar.
This brings home the importance of creative imagination, human perversities and fictitious relationship in the formation and function of human ecosystems. Our position with regard to method-fortheory is that a synthetic understanding of human
ecology must integrate the creative/imaginary/supernatural systems with those previously recognized
as ecology sensu stricto.

A paradigm is a worldview, belief system, series of assumptions, methods and techniques, and exemplars for problem
solution held in common by a scientific community (cf. Khun 1970).

Vol. 5 2001
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To help imagine that a synthesis of these diverse aspects of human ecology is possible, we offer Rappaport’s (1971,1984) model of ritual regulation and ecosystem function among the Maring,
a horticultural people of the New Guinea Highlands (Figure 1e). Here, complex relationships with
a powerful spirit world are integrated in a holistic
understanding of the supernatural belief system,
community and inter-group social relations, and
local subsistence activities. A human ecosystems
theory premised on the methodological prescription of radical synthesis must begin where
Rappaport left off. All relevant components of hu-

9

man ecology, i.e. physical, biological, social and cultural (including spiritual) must be integrated in the
development of models that attempt to describe, and
ultimately understand, human ecosystems.
Recommendation note for reading the rest of
this essay
After perusing the six introductory system illuminations, you may wish to go directly to Section II,
in which the prelude to human ecosystem theory
is laid out. After skimming this section, you can
go back to Section I: Method for Theory and entertain the document in its entirety.

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1
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FIGURE 1A. AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN 1980 (H.T. Odum 1983,

3

The original figure caption cites Odum and Odum 1980: Courtesy McGraw-Hill Book Company. However, this model does not appear
in either the 1976 or 1981 edition of Energy Basis for Man and Nature (McGraw Hill). Apparently it first appears in Systems Ecology
1983, but therein H.T. Odum gives an erroneous citation.

The modeling conventions used here are based in part on thermodynamic principles: the conservation and entropy
laws. The global heat sink at the bottom represents all the entropy losses. Circles represent sources of energy that
serve to drive the system. Energy storage is depicted with a birdhouse-like icon. The bullet icon represents producers
of energy (plants) from which energy flows to consumers, depicted by the hexagon. The arrowheads are flow interaction or control gates. Rectangular enclosures are used for miscellaneous subsystems and processes. There are two
types of flows: 1) a straight line depicting energy flow, and 2) a dashed line with a $ sign depicting money flow.
There are five subsystems that are grouped together in staggered columns with the vertical groupings suggesting relationships between the components in each column. The first column (starting at the left) represents biomes.
The second, ecosystems, with the vertical hierarchy based on degree of human manipulation (top less, bottom more).
The third and fourth columns depict commerce: the third column shows processes that have some non-human
energy inputs, while the fourth are fully industrial processes using fossil fuels. The last column represents a variety of
human social sectors and institutions. Overall, the subsystems and their dominant flows are arranged left to right in
order of increasing energy quality (increasing amounts of embodied energy).

Figure 23-17)3.

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1

FIGURE 1B. HUMAN GLOBAL SYSTEM MODEL (Forrester 1971, Fig.2.1).
This human ecosystem model, created under the auspices of the Club of Rome, focuses on five quantitative variables (accumulations
within the system, depicted as rectangles): population; natural resources; capital investment; capital-investment-in-agriculture fraction;
and pollution. These accumulations/variables are interrelated in dynamic ways. Specifically, the levels of the variables are caused to
change by flows. Two types of flows are used here, information (the dashed line) and material flows (the solid line). (Forrester 1961
recognizes six types of flows.) Decision functions determine the rate of flows, in this case material flows. Decision functions act as
valves, such as the one for birth rate in the upper left corner. Only information leads into a decision function. The very small circles
are information take-offs, or branching points, of an information flow. The very small circles with the bar through them are information take-off parameters that act as (temporary) constants. The large circles are concepts that act as auxiliary information variables.
They are concepts that have been separated from the decision functions because they have independent meaning, and significant
influence controlling flows. The irregular cloud icons are sources or sinks for the material flows and lie outside the system as depicted.
All of the closed loops are feedback loops. Some of them are “positive-feedback loops” that generate growth in the system. Other
loops, the majority here, are goal seeking “negative-feedback loops” that move the system toward some objective (Forrester 1969).

FIGURE 1C. THE SPIRIT WORLD: A CHRISTIAN BELIEF SYSTEM (Larkin 1920).
Originally designed as a wall chart for Clarence Larkin’s Baptist ministry4 in early 20th Century
Pennsylvania, this graphic model displays the historico-spiritual (proscribed) evolution of humankind
(from left to right) with special attention to differential pathways followed by human souls in their
obligatory relationship to celestial spirits. This is a system regulated by the gates/switches of Divine
Judgement (upper right corner), where souls are sorted into the ‘Righteous’ and the ‘Wicked,’ each
with separate final destinations (‘Heaven’ and ‘The Lake of Fire,’ respectively). The Spirit World is an
alternate universe that Christians gain access to in the after-life. In this system, final decisions are
made by supreme beings; humans are regulated as flows of matter (reposited bodies that are redistrib-

uted at resurrection and judgement, upper right) and as energy (eternal souls) that unite upper panels (‘The
Heavenly Places’) with the mundane (three Earths, Paradise and Hell). A fundamental dialectical tension is
maintained between ‘Righteous Spirits’ (Christ, God, Pure Angels) and ‘Wicked Spirits’ (Satan and other Fallen
Angels), while humans negotiate between the two.
4

Larkin (1850-1924) was trained as a draftsman and was called to preach the Word of God later in life. He created at least 62
religious wall charts, relying heavily on his early training in the graphical representation of systemic functioning for expression and
illumination of his religious beliefs.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1

In this postmodern cosmos, the Spirit World is
closer than one might think. Using irreverent
satire, this figure depicts a hierarchical universe
analogous to the Christian one in which ‘elect’
humans (those ordained by the Church of the
Subgenius) gain access to ‘Helle’ and ever-ascendant supra-universes (the place you really want to
end up in…) while other humans suffer in the
abyss of ‘Heaven.’ Still essentially dualistic, hierarchical panels are disassembled into seeming chaotic
morasses of gross humanity. Upon closer inspection, however, we find that distinct pathways do
exist, such as the maze portals of ‘false slack’ that
deposit unworthy souls into ‘The Abyss’(middle
left), and conversely, the escape vessels and transformative path that leads into ‘Bob’s’ mouth (upper
middle right). Reigning spirits of the upper panel
are, principally, Bob Dobbs, and secondarily, the
pantheons in Asgard and Valhalla. The lower panel
is ruled by unseemly spirits including ‘God,’ some
angels and various devilish creatures. Here, fueled
by fear itself, humans are tortured with selfinflicted punishments—they can escape “if only
they would stop believing…” (Stang 1994:88).
Ultimately, however, the postmodern spirit guide
(‘the punchline’) is the ‘Pot o’ Gold.’ We are left
with a somewhat ambivalent feeling: to what
extent are we living the afterlife right now?

(Robins, in Stang 1994:89).

FIGURE 1D. A POSTMODERN (AFTER) LIFE
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Rappaport’s functional model of a Tsembaga Maring ecosystem is the first known diagrammatic attempt at integrating supernatural beliefs and cycles of ritual practice with ‘local ecosystemic processes.’ His depiction is of a cybernetic system in which beliefs
and ritual practices regulate the relative abundance of pigs, social harmony and ultimately, human population. Rappaport separates system components into horizontal panels. Each panel portrays a domain that is a critical part of larger interrelations between the spirit world, the practiced ritual cycle, extra-community relations and biological constraints and affordances. In the top
panel, ‘The Spirit World,’ Smoke Woman mediates between the living, the dead, and other influential spirits in the system,
effectively guiding the Maring (through their shamans) in a proscribed but delicate cycle of segregation and integration. Red
Spirits (strong, dry, hot) exist in dialectical opposition to the Spirits of Rot (fertile, moist, deathly). Both harbor members who
were once living Maring and are involved in Maring affairs at various levels. The management of these complex spirit relationships
is accomplished through the processes delineated in the middle two panels which in turn are intrinsically related to the bottom
panel of local subsistence processes. In ‘The Ritual Cycle’ panel, a simplified outline of the Maring ritual cycle is given, showing
the (supernatural) obligations incurred in daily living (triggers, ‘T’) and the rituals (‘R’) that satisfy them (taboo, pig sacrifice,
planting of rumbim, etc.). The cycle starts over with the rituals that signify the end of a year-long festival, after which taboos are
lifted and maximum integration is achieved both in the Spirit World and in the local social system. The next panel, ‘Inter-Group
Relations,’ depicts social events such as inter-group homicide and warfare, truces and festivals. Throughout the ritual cycle, pigs
are killed. This effectively regulates the local pig population (bottom panel, ‘Local Subsistence’), which reduces garden invasions
and labor obligations (primarily for women). This model can be seen as a benchmark in the move towards synthesis of the major
components of human ecosystems. It integrates cybernetic systems principles with the humanistic and informational depictions of
socio-cultural-spiritual systems.

duced with permission of the estate).

FIGURE 1E. RITUAL REGULATION AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTION AMONG THE MARING (Slightly modified from Rappaport 1971, 1984; repro-
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tesian mind-body separation problem. Gaps in
understanding widen as polar positions become
entrenched. Discontinuity and fragmented understandings may become ends in themselves, perpetuating closed intellectual environments. NonetheThis section is concerned with the structure and less, dichotomous debate can be resolved through
use of theory. Following Pickett, Kolasa and Jones integration, ultimately leading to more holistic
(1994) we recognize the value of explicitly laying understandings.
out methods5 and conceptual constructs for building theory and promoting intellectual integration. Theoretical Progress Via Integration
This effort relies on a long history of development An initial simplified working definition of intein the philosophy of science that we will not do gration is the amalgamation of existing theory,
justice to here, as our goal is to provide only a brief perspectives, approaches, models or data that are
overview of the nature of theory, motivations for apparently disparate. Although a desirable goal,
its development, taxonomy, anatomy, ontogeny, achieving integration is not easy. Some of the proand some of the environmental contexts in which cedures and circumstances necessary for successful
it is found. Together, these constitute method-for- integration include: (1) Specifying Domain. For
theory.6 This framework will then be used to sketch integration to happen, the focus or domain of the
the raw beginnings of an integrative theory of hu- relevant theories/subdisciplines, which are the subman ecosystems in Section II.
jects of integration, must be clearly stated. With

SECTION I.
METHOD FOR THEORY

A. THE NATURE OF THEORY
In addition to the plausible benefits of increasing
precision in conceptualization and clarity in communication, sensitivity to the structure of theory
offers some less tangible rewards. Among the rationales for sensitivity to theory, Pickett, Kolasa
and Jones (1994:58) point out that theory “[h]elps
you make decisions about what to do next in a
world in which ‘everything is a little bit interesting’ but only some things are worthwhile,” and
also, “[p]revents you from getting lost in the threatening tide of details.”
Sensitivity to the nature of theory also puts
dichotomous and fragmented debates into perspective (see Figure 2), since exclusionary tendencies
often develop out of protracted dichotomous debate. Examples from our intellectual heritage include the irritating nature/culture debate (for discussion see Scoones 1999:486); and the old Car-

clearly defined subject matter and boundaries, the
development of linkages between the theories becomes more feasible. (2) Conceptual Clarification.
The domain is not the only component of theory
that needs to be clearly delineated. There is usually confusion about the meanings and subjects of
specific concepts within a theory. Clarification of
concepts also enables the asking of new questions
that may further integration and the development
of theory. (3) Consideration of Scale and Level. Integration requires consideration of the scale(s) at
which a theory operates. Theories may answer questions across levels of organization, particularly adjacent levels of a particular scale, as in Figure 3a
(bottom part) or Table 1.
Studies within ecology sensu lato can be ordered on several axes to illustrate the diversity of
research areas within this arena (Likens 1992).
Figure 3a represents the subdisciplines of bioecology7 ordered along an axis of abiotic to biotic foci
(Likens 1992; Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994).

‘Methods,’ as used here, refers to principles of inquiry. ‘Techniques’ refers to crafted procedures and proficient artisanal
skills. The focus of this essay is on methods.
6
Method-for-theory refers to the process of understanding what theory is, how it is constructed and how it is used to
achieve goals of understanding and explanation.
7
Here, bioecology refers to what is more conventionally simply called ‘ecology,’ to facilitate use of the term ecology (sensu
lato) for the domain that includes both biophysical ecology and sociocultural ecology.
5

LAST
BITE
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FIGURE 2. RIDING THE WAVE (Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology 1999:91).
The postmodern consumer capitalist environment as a final commentary on the relevance of dichotomous and fragmented contemporary discourse. Humor, because it is an innate mechanism for
dealing with cognitive dissonance, can raise representational states to higher levels of complexity. In
this case anthropological debate is situated within the impending doom of a runaway revolution in
information technology. Here the felt need for a more holistic understanding or overarching theory is
created by the reader’s eye view.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1
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The diverse discipline of human ecology can also
be schematically depicted along axes of organization. As such, Figure 3b includes some of the subdisciplines and subject matter that contribute to
human ecology. This contributing subject matter
is ordered: (1) horizontally within multiple categories of environment (physical, biological, cultural,
and social); and (2) vertically along a hierarchical
scale of organization (individual to population to
world systems). The diversity of the contributing
subject matter illustrates the daunting challenge
presented to those interested in achieving integration within human ecology.

Vol. 5 2001

Understanding and Explanation

Understanding is experience made intelligible by
applying concepts and categories to apprehending
the general relations between particulars. Scientific
understanding is an ‘objectively’ determined match
between some set of confirmable, observable phenomena in the non-human and human world(s)
and a conceptual construct. Some of the components of this type of understanding can be seen in
Figure 4. Our take on the components reflects a
philosophy of human sciences that draws heavily
on the humanities.

Systematics
Physiology
Genetics

BIOTIC FOCUS

ABIOTIC FOCUS
Meteorology
Hydrology
Geology

B

Biogeochemistry
Ecosystem Ecology
Landscape Ecology
Community Ecology
Population Ecology
Behavioral Ecology
Physiological Ecology

FIGURE 3A. SPECTRUM OF ECOLOGICAL SUBDISCIPLINES (Modified from Likens 1992).
The field of ecology, in the broadest sense, incorporates a variety of studies ranging from those
that focus on abiotic relationships to those that focus on biotic relationships. The bottom part
of the figure depicts one of many possible dimensional axes for topic areas and subdisciplines
in biological ecology.

Vol. 5 2001
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FIGURE 3B. HIERARCHY OF HUMAN ECOLOGY WITH CONTRIBUTING TOPIC AREAS AND SUBDISCIPLINES.
Human ecology is a broad field. Contributing topic areas and subdisciplines can be ordered along two
axes. The first (horizontal) axis illustrates the four environments (physical, biological, social, and cultural)
in which subdisciplines focus their studies. Not all contributors operate in all four environments. The
second (vertical) axis illustrates the scale of organization at which the subdisciplines and subject matter
tend to operate. The multiple environments exist in a vertical hierarchy of organization, from the individual (reproduction of daily life) at the lowest level on up to the population, and ultimately to the
highest level, the global world system. We have located some subfields relevant to human ecology in a
hierarchy across the scope of multiple environments. This is by no means an exhaustive accounting of
possible subfields.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1
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The relationship between understanding and
explanation is that explanation is the process of
relating conceptual constructs to observable phenomena, and understanding is the professed and
hoped for result of this process. Explanation may
(among other things): (1) relate phenomena (patterns) to causal mechanisms; (2) resolve phenomena into processes at lower hierarchical levels (Pattee
1973); and (3) contextualize phenomena within
larger processes.

Vol. 5 2001

B. MOTIVATING THEORY:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
AND RADICAL SYNTHESIS
Fundamental Questions

“Fundamental questions are the most effective tools
for advancing understanding because they address
any one of five ways to improve theory” (Pickett,
Kolasa and Jones 1994:113). Specifically, fundamental questions can lead to: (1) establishment of

TABLE 1. HIERARCHY OF HUMAN ECOLOGICAL LEVELS.
ECOLOGICAL
LEVEL

SCOPE AND DOMAIN8

SOME
COMPONENTS/
PRINCIPLES

INTELLECTUAL
AWARENESS
to date

WORLD SYSTEMS
Global
Subregional

Components include
global synoptic
processes down to
local systems

Dominated by
fragmented logics

POPULATION
Cities
Communities
Demes
Family/Household

Components are
populations in local
systems

Analysis of
aggregates

INDIVIDUAL
Socially Interacting
Socially Isolated

Components include
physiological
processes
(harmonics) in the
individual as a
system with input and
output environments

Demographic bias

A

B

C

Consensus/
Optimality
EEAness
(Environments of
Evolutionary
Adaptedness)
Individuals as agents

8

Dual Significations: two interpretations of the depicted scope and domain are possible. The first is the possible scope
of an individual’s world, represented by three examples (A,B,C hexagons): (A) a jet-setter with big business or NGO
connections; (B) the president of one of the big-five nations; (C) a local community leader. The second interpretation
is that the three hexagons depict possible theoretical domains or (dis)continua across human ecological levels: (A) full
spanning of all levels; (B) ruptured understanding; (C) restricted scope of analysis.

CONCEPTUAL
CONSTRUCTS

25
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M. Tools

DOMAIN

MANAGEMENT
X. Tools

OBSERVABLE
PHENOMENA

REFINEMENT

Tools for Conceptual
Refinement
Scholarship Diversity
Fundamental Questions
Lateral Thinking
Assumptions
Definitions
Abstraction
(Essentialization)
Classification
Simplification
Idealization
Reflexivity
Critical Theory
Deduction
Generalization
Holism

Delimiting
the Domain
Noumena
Pro cesses
Flows
Relations
Individuals
Levels of
Organization
Scale
Dynamics

FIGURE 4. COMPONENTS

OF

Methodological Tools

(Mis)Management Tools

Expanding Contextualization
Developing Expectation
Dialectics
Surrealism
Deconstruction
Transformation
Model Building
Translation Modes
Causal Explanation
Multiple Working Hypotheses
Inductive Generalization
Rules of Evidence

Accounting
Business Ethics
Shortsightedness
Unacknowledged Circumstances
Broad-scale-issue Avoidance
Biased Expertise
Privileging the Client
Disparagement of
Complementary Initiatives
Pseudo-change
Solution Production

S CIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING (Adapted from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones

1994, Fig.2).

This model represents a way of parsing out some of the responsibilities of a method for building
theory. Conceptual constructs are continually refined through two processes. The first involves
internal refinement through the use of several conceptual tools. The second results from
(re)specification of the domain, particularly the definition of relationships between different conceptual constructs. Delimiting the domain requires that attention be paid to scope, scale and process,
but it also requires the employment of methodological tools for relating the domain to observable
phenomena. Typically, science is caricatured as doing this through hypothesis testing (via rules for
evidence), causal explanation and model building. Understanding in the field of human ecology
requires additional methodological tools for teasing out complexity. Typically external to theory
building, applied human ecology requires management tools to relate the ‘real world’ to the theoretical framework. These tools are often critiqued for their inability to achieve goals. That this is the case
indicates a lack of development of these tools by the practitioners of management, resulting in part
from an emphasis on territoriality, immediate gain, advertising, and obfuscation of assumptions.
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theory or missing theoretical components; (2) refinement of theoretical components; (3) rejection
of inadequate theory or inadequate theoretical
components; (4) replacement of a theory or some
of its components; and (5) increasing the scope of
theory.
Figure 5 shows a number of types of questions that may not be mutually exclusive, but that
do have different motivations and foci. Among
these, fundamental questions are those aimed at
changing/advancing the structure or content of understanding. Their loci for action are usually the
conceptual constructs or the lines of interaction
between theory and observable phenomena (Figure 6). Limits to current understanding invite ongoing efforts to identify and address fundamental
questions as a crucial part of theory building.
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Formulating fundamental questions can also
facilitate change in understanding by clarifying the
scope of inquiry. Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions
are an attempt to acknowledge different ways of
answering the question ‘Why?’ in biology. These
questions can be summarized as: (1) functional
(questions about the adaptiveness of behavior); (2)
proximate (questions about the mechanisms of
behavior); (3) ontogenetic (questions about how
behavior changes through development of an organism); (4) phylogenetic (questions about the
ways behavior changes as species evolve). By distinguishing between these fundamental types of
questions and the distinct answers they generate,
Tinbergen helped bring theoretical clarity to otherwise sterile debates about which is the correct
response to any given ‘Why’ question.

FUNDAMENTAL
Components of Understanding

IMPORTANT
Of Societal Concern

QUESTION
TYPES

GENERAL
Scope

INTERESTING
Personal

SPECIFIC
Scope
Scope
BIG
Scale

FIGURE 5. TYPES OF QUESTIONS (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 6.2. Reproduced with permission of publisher).

Fundamental questions are concerned with the components of understanding within a field of
science. “Big” questions are broad scale. The labels “general” or “specific” refer to the size of the
conceptual scope or inclusiveness of the domain addressed. Important questions are those of societal
interest, whereas interesting questions are motivated by personal fascination. These types of question
are not mutually exclusive.
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“In case several fundamental questions are
competing for attention, they may be ranked according to their logical precedence, clarity, and potential to unify” (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994:113). Fundamental questions should be prioritized to the extent that they are interesting, feasible, fulfill logical requirements already present in
theory, establish sound and clear concepts (Novak
and Gowin 1984), as well as definitions and interactions, while encompassing a broad scope so as to
advance generality (Kuhn 1977, Mayr 1982,
Slobodkin 1985). Even if such questions are privileged they may lead to incorrect theory, but in the
process greater clarity of concepts, hypotheses and
tests may be achieved.

Fundamental questions should tend, by definition, to new theories.9 While keeping the scope
of the inquiry in mind, fundamental questions ask
about observed patterns of phenomena and possible explanatory processes/mechanisms. In this endeavor, judgement, reason and previously accepted
ideas must be temporarily suspended so as not to
constrain the person or group who seek alternative explanations (see Appendix for more on the
possibilities of team thinking). Alternative explanations also come from within theory by unreasonably performing an extreme application of the
building blocks of theory (generalization, idealization, abstraction, hierarchical integration), individually or in combination with others.

UNDERSTANDING

CONCEPTUAL
CONSTRUCTS

OBSERVABLE
PHENOMENA

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
Establish
Refine
Reject
Replace
Expand

FIGURE 6. THE RELATIONSHIP OF FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING (From Pickett, Kolasa
& Jones 1994, Fig. 6.1. Reproduced with permission of publisher).

Fundamental questions can change understanding in one or more of five ways by which they affect
theory: by establishing new theory; refining existing theory or components of existing theory; rejecting theory or components of theory; replacing flawed theory or components; and expanding existing
domains of theory.
9

Where do radically new theories come from? See the Green Hat, Appendix.
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C. TAXONOMY OF THEORY

Integration and Synthesis
Theoretical understanding changes through the
integration of disparate paradigms. This is the option of radical synthesis. Specifying the disparate
paradigms and identifying possible fundamental
questions to guide cross-paradigm integration helps
to articulate an idea toward which integration can
aspire.
Two general ways of synthesizing disparate
areas of understanding are additive and extractive
integration. In the first, two or more complete theories are connected, perhaps ultimately merged,
through the implications of asking a very broad
scale question. The paradox of additive integration
is that the product may be more than the sum of
its parts (Figure 7a). In extractive integration, selected components of different theories are
recontextualized to provide new building blocks
and relations. Here the result is expected to be synergistic (Figure 7b).

A taxonomy of theory must reflect differences
among the goals or objectives, the structure, and
the foci of domains of different kinds of theories,
and hence, their modes of understanding. As a result of differences in objectives, structure and domain, theories can be classified along at least the
four axes of temporality, phenomenology, abstraction and generality (see Table 2). But, because theories are complex systems, a single theory can have
components that span different classes. The four
axes are not mutually exclusive.

Temporality
Theoretical understandings differ in their emphasis on the degree and kinds of causality attributed
to prior states vs. current relationships. The term
‘contingency’ allows the understanding that current relationships and constraints have accumulated
from past interactions.

TABLE 2. KINDS OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Table 5.1).
Classes

Dichotomous Characters

Instantaneous
Vs.
Long term

Ahistorical Historical
Still Life

Evolutionary

Dynamic (emergent) Static (design)

Phenomenological
vs.
Mechanistic

Existentialistic

Formal

10

Factual

Normative Descriptive
Hypothetical

General
vs.
Specific

Mechanical

Dialectical Nondialectical
Axiomatic Nonaxiomatic

Abstract10
vs.
Literal

10
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Empirical

Postulative Constructive
Universal Local

Continua rather than strict dichotomies.

Strategic

Tactical

Additive Integration
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UNDERSTANDING
Understanding 1

Understanding 2

SYNTHESIS

Understanding 1

Understanding 2

BIG QUESTIONS

FIGURE 7A. ADDITIVE INTEGRATION (From Pickett, Kolasa & Jones 1994, Fig. 7.1. Reproduced with permission of publisher).

Two or more relatively complete areas of understanding can be linked or amalgamated in their
entirety to produce new theoretical understanding. This synthesis is additive integration. The impetus for such integration often comes from general or “big” questions.
E xtractive Int egration
UNDERSTANDING 3

SYNTHESIS

Understanding 1

Understanding 2

BIG QUESTIONS

FIGURE 7B. EXTRACTIVE INTEGRATION (From Pickett, Kolasa & Jones 1994, Fig. 7.2. Reproduced with
permission of publisher).

Select parts of existing theories may be extracted and synthesized to formulate new, integrated
understanding. Extractive integration is often motivated by general or “big” questions.
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Phenomenology

D. ANATOMY OF THEORY

Theories may conceptualize phenomena as being
caused by dynamic interactions (phenomenology)
which are not reducible to components at lower
levels, or as being caused by underlying mechanisms. Hierarchical nesting usually allows us to
ignore typical contradictions between these two
extremes (Pattee 1973).

Anatomy refers to the structure of theory, how it is
delimited and the components out of which it is
constructed. An overview of the variety of the components of theory is presented in Box 1.

Abstraction
Models may range from highly specific space-time
contexts to abstract, ideal (including unreal) systems.

Generality

Basic Conceptual Components of Theory
Notions
Notions are informal beginnings. They are often
provided by imagination, intuition, analogy and
metaphor, and can provide material for the development of theory. From the creative side come the
juxtapositions, psychotic brainstorms and insights
upon which methodological tools may be brought
to bear such that conceptual constructs are created
and domains constructed. If something is intuitively plausible, then it is likely a notion, as mature theory is often counterintuitive.

Theories unlinked by nesting or hierarchy to other
theory may maximize only two of the following
three parameters: generality, precision, realism
(Levins 1966). The degree of generality or specificity of a theory depends on the extent to which
both precision and realism are being employed. If
both are considered important, generality will be Assumptions
Assumptions include postulates, boundary condiminimal.
tions, facts from other theories, and logical relaBOX 1. COMPONENTS OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 3.2).
Basic Conceptual Devices
Assumptions—conditions or axioms needed to build theory
Definitions—conventions and prescriptions necessary for the theory to work with clarity
Concepts—abstract ideas generalized from regularities in phenomena, or conceived
through reflection and imagination
Empirical Content
Facts—confirmable records of phenomena, checked and re-checked across time
Confirmed Generalizations—condensations and abstractions from a body of facts that
have been checked and re-checked
Derived Conceptual Devices
Hypotheses—testable statements derived from or representing various components of
theory
Models—conceptual constructs that represent or simplify the world or subject matter of
concern
Theorems—ideas or propositions deduced or proposed as demonstrable deductions
Framework and Structure
Framework––nested causal or logical structure of a theory
Domain––the scope in space, time and phenomena addressed by a theory
Translation modes––procedures and concepts needed to move from the abstractions of a
theory to the specifics of application or test
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tionships between facts. Assumptions are statements about the nature of a domain. These axioms are required before theory can be built. At the
start of systematic inquiry, guesswork is often required to choose among seemingly unlimited alternative assumptions. Poorly developed theory can
result from leaving assumptions implicit rather than
making them explicit. Illumination of implicit or
background assumptions can be quite revealing.
Longino (1990) discusses the case in which the
same body of evidence is said to support conflicting hypotheses or theories, depending upon the
investigator’s world view or background beliefs and
assumptions.
Definitions
Definitions express the essential nature of things.
They help specify and convey meanings in definite, clear and determining ways. Among the
things that must be defined in a theory are the
basic objects and relationships that are the subject
matter of that theory.
Concepts
Concepts are generalizations or abstractions of
regularities, patterns, and imagined possibilities.
They can refer to individuals, phenomena or relationships (Leary 1985) that are explicit enough to
be evaluated.

Empirical Content of Theory
Observations
We distinguish between the observations that we
make when we are awake and those we make when
we are asleep and dreaming. Those observations
that we treat as matters-of-fact are open to re-evaluation, their status as facts depend significantly on
the ongoing process of renewed observation, or in
the case of unique events, checking and
contextualizing the record.
Accepted Facts
In human systems the acceptance of facts depends
at least in part upon the conceptual environment.
Some propositions and the evidence that they are
facts may not be accepted, while other proposi-
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tions with very little or no supporting evidence may
be treated as facts. Contrasting viewpoints and critical examination of underlying assumptions are two
of the procedures used in the consensual establishment of facts.
Confirmed Generalizations
The abstraction of accumulated records of facts can
result in confirmed generalizations. This inductive
activity allows a group of observations or facts to
become a basic building block for theory, providing material for hypotheses, models and theorems.
Contingent on the qualities of the facts, confirmed
generalizations are given more credence as supporting evidence accumulates.

Derived Conceptual Components
of Theory
Hypotheses
Hypotheses relate conceptual constructs to observable phenomena. They are tentative assumptions
and explanations that help formalize expectations
and provide grounds for action.
Models
Models are externalized simplified conceptual or
mental iconic representations of a system or process, put forward as a basis for theoretical or empirical understanding. Generally they depict some
of the overall structure of the system, and those
information causality pathways and materials/energy flows that result in the symptoms of interest.
Theorems
Theorems are derived constructs, deduced from
assumptions, definitions, basic concepts or the axiomatic structure of models and theories.

Theory Framework and Structure: Theory
as System
Framework
A theoretical framework unites all components of
theory in a coherent conceptual structure (Figure
8). Relationships between conceptual devices are
laid out, including the relations between back-
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FIGURE 8. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPONENTS OF THEORY.
This figure illustrates the relationships between the various components of theory (see Box 1). The
domain is the spatial and temporal scope that a theory addresses, while the framework of a theory
provides the logical structure. Observations of the ‘real world’ (from both within and without the
theory’s domain) contribute to notions and facts about that world. In time, facts can become confirmed generalizations. These empirical components inform basic conceptual devices (assumptions,
definitions and concepts). Translation modes relate the empirical content and basic conceptual
devices to more derived conceptual devices (hypotheses, models and theorems). Translation modes
also relate empirical content and the basic and derived conceptual devices to the real world phenomena that the theory addresses through tests of proposed hypotheses. Additionally, translation modes
relate the empirical content, conceptual devices, and results of tested hypotheses to the structure of
the theory, allowing for revisions and clarification of the theory’s domain and framework.
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ground assumptions, theoretical constraints and the structs in a subtheory domain need not apply to
conceptual inputs and outputs for theoretical mod- the broader theoretical domain nor to other
subtheories, but the importance of determining
els. Frameworks change as theories mature.
whether or not they do apply cannot be overstated.
Hierarchy
The several potential domains of inquiry of a theory Translation Modes
should be related explicitly to each other in a mean- Translation modes facilitate the conceptual transingful way. Typically, this occurs by creating a hi- position of abstract ideas, generalizations and moderarchical organization of (sub)theories varying by els to specific domains and on-the-ground appliscale in time, space and organization. As such, cations in experimental or field situations, and back
domains are often covered by subtheories, which again.
may be used for different jobs (Pattee 1973) and
Openness
confer different levels of generality.
To maintain a dialogue between abstract or idealized domains and observable phenomena for testDomain
Domains delimit the scope in space, time and level ing and theory revision, a framework requires transof organization of “a class of phenomena assumed lation modes. The space that the translation modes
(by theory) to share certain properties and be of a fill is inherently open. Openness in theoretical sysdistinct and general type” (Hirschfeld and Gelman tems of understanding also is noted where observ1994:21). The domains of an inquiry should be able phenomena are renamed as facts or confirmed
explicit and specific, as much as possible, though generalizations, inside theoretical frameworks.
they may be expanded or restricted as theory de- Openness of theory does not preclude the imporvelops. Domains typically become more and more tance of axiomatic deduction in the development
restricted as theory develops, because refinement of theory.
shows that the theory is not as grandly applicable
E. ONTOGENY OF THEORY
as originally presumed.
As mentioned above (under hierarchy), do- The utility of a theory depends upon its ontogemains may lend themselves to different levels of netic state, or degree of maturation, at a particular
generality depending on their breadth or their point in time. Content and structure can change
scope. Particularly important for designating a along three axes: completeness, development and
domain are the relevant phenomena, concepts, and integration (Box 2). Completeness refers to the
scales (time, space, organization). Conceptual con- inclusion of items on the roster of theory compoBOX 2. THREE AXES OF THEORY CHANGE (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994, Box 4.1).

Completeness—the different components of theory listed in Box 1 have different jobs to play
in a theory: More complete theories, i.e., those with more of the components, can do more of
the jobs required, e.g. abstract, simplify, generalize, explain, and predict, than those that are
less complete
Development—well-developed theory has more clearly derived conceptual constructs, more
explicit conceptually and empirically rich components, more thoroughly worked out and
refined components
Integration—in more mature theory, the connections among the components are better
articulated; dependency and unification are more explicit, with most of the components in place
and related to each other within a framework specifying structure of the theory as a whole
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nents in Box 1, keeping in mind that components
can be added. Development refers to the refinement
of components; they should be better worked out
over time. Integration is indicated by increasingly
well articulated connections among the components.

Why Theory Change is Important

“Failure to recognize how theory changes or indeed, that theory changes at all can be an impediment to furthering… understanding and integration” (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994:86). Immature theories lack components and integrating
links. An immature theory may be prematurely
rejected or entirely ignored when it is subjected to
an over-designed test or heavily negative (non-constructive) criticism at an early developmental stage.

Ontogeny and Testing
Early in its development, a theory might not allow
appropriate tests of its validity. Without a specified framework, tests may encourage or discourage further development, but are quite meaningless. Even with a clear framework, strong theories
can fail to predict behavior. At this point, intervening variables should be tested before throwing
the baby out with the bath water. This process is a
continual integration of related constructs, theories and paradigms, beholden to logical empirical
consistency.

Vol. 5 2001

Scope And Refutation
Broad-scoped, well-developed theories are less easily
refuted by only a few failures, since other variables
and theories may be integrated to save the theory.
Finer scale theories may be refuted by fewer cases
of failure, due to fewer possible intervening processes, and less possibility of subdivision.

Conceptual Refinements

Conceptual constructs may be refined as a result
of expansion of observable phenomena (externally),
or logical or conceptual changes (internally). Application of theory requires an awareness of the
ontogenetic status and development of the conceptual constructs.

How Theories Change: Theory Assembly,
Development, Maturity

As theory develops, it becomes more and more
complete, by the addition and refinement of theoretical notions, constructs, derived constructs, and
structure. Figure 9 shows both increase in the number and refinement of components as theory matures. At first the emphasis is on the addition of
components. By the consolidating stage of theory
development all of the components are in place.
Subsequently, refinement of components is what
is emphasized. The refinement of components
marks a second stage in the development of theory.

BOX 3. STAGES TO THEORY MATURITY (Based on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 4.1 and
Figure 4.1).

Pre-theoretic—represented by rudimentary development of a few components
Intuitive—simple and fundamental components present, including definitions, concepts,
and models
Consolidating—derived conceptual devices begin to mature
Empirical-Interactive—with concepts, definitions, and domain increasingly clarified,
hypotheses are more amenable to evaluation
Confirmed or Rejected—judgement by the community of the adequacy of evaluation
and strength of those outcomes for a mature theory; confirmed theories often permit
practical application

35

Method for Theory

Vol. 5 2001

The stages of maturation shown in Figure 9
and summarized in Box 3 can be thought of as an
idealized developmental sequence. Theory change
is actually often haphazard, reflecting an amalgam
of different empirical pursuits and different
subtheories, and in some instances more complex
or highly derived components arise before simpler
ones. Drawing on other theories for components
may also result in transfer problems, where those
components acquire different meanings and interpretations in their new context. Nonetheless, the
key idea is that the jobs a theory is able to do depend upon its stage of maturity, i.e. the richness of

its roster of theoretical components and their refinement.
As a theory begins to take shape and to be
used it often becomes clear that existing components must be replaced or refined. Theory may
emerge from pre-theoretic notions by adding components, without showing much refinement. At
the consolidating stage basic conceptual components are refined, empirical content is refined and
expanded, derived conceptual components are
added and refined, and the theoretical framework
and structure begin to become apparent. Measures
of component refinement include exactitude, empirical certainty, applicability and derivativeness.

DEGREE OF DEVELOPMENT
Status
Component
Notions
Assumptions

Pretheoretic

Intuitive

Consolidating

EmpiricalInteractive

Confirmed
or Rejected

/////
/////

/////
//////
/////
/////
/////

/////
/////////
//////
//////
//////
/////

/////
/////////
/////////
/////////
/////////
//////

///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////

/////

/////
/////

/////

/////

//////
//////
/////
/////
//////
/////

/////////
/////////
//////
/////
///////
//////

///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////
///////////

Definitions
Concepts
Facts
Confirmed
Generalizations
Hypotheses

/////

Models
Theorems
Framework
Domain
Translation
Modes

FIGURE 9. COMPLETENESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 4.1).
See Box 1 for a description of the components. Degree of hatching denotes increased refinement and
precision in theory development.
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Exactitude
Exactitude reflects the explicitness of the components of theory, how clearly assumptions are stated,
the completeness of the stated domain, and the
specificity and manner of presentation of the derived conceptual components. Clarity of terminology is a key aspect of exactitude. Because words
can sometimes have more than one meaning (for
example a word’s common versus its scientific usage) confusion regarding terminology often occurs.
One should therefore clearly and explicitly state
the meanings of terminology that are critical to a
theory. Imprecise words usually mean muddled
thoughts. If you are unable to state what you mean
explicitly, then the odds are good that you do not
really have a firm grasp on what it is that you are
trying to say. Perhaps you are dealing with the
ineffable.
Empirical Certainty
Empirical certainty reflects the degree to which
facts and empirical generalizations are confirmed
and evaluated, as well as the manner in which this
is done.
Applicability
Applicability centers largely on translation modes.
The applicability of a theory refers to how well the
derived conceptual components are applied to observable phenomena. The translation modes help
to link derived and empirical components.
Derivativeness
Derivativeness requires that the individual components and their relationships be analyzed. Here
analysis refers to the working out of the implications of the components. Just as a theory develops
via a dialog between the theory and the world it is
designed to provide an understanding of, theories
also develop through a dialog between the components of theory. This dialog will come from analysis of theoretical components and the refinement
of theoretical concepts. Clarification of the components of a theory usually leads to the revision of
the relationships between components. Internal
consistency is a hallmark of mature theory.
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In mature theories, components are well developed, well integrated and provide completeness
(see Box 2). Complete theories have well-defined
basic conceptual constructs and derived conceptual devices, as well as well-delineated domains,
with internal structure and empirical content, allowing the development of hypotheses that can be
confirmed or rejected. Confirmed mature theory
has developed through prior phases of pre-theory,
intuition, consolidation and empirical-interaction
(see Box 3). Such theories come to represent the
particular historical time periods within which
they have developed.

Methodological Tools in the Development
of Theory
A number of the methodological tools available to
develop and refine conceptual constructs are listed
in Figure 4. Diversity of scholarship is directly
related to the diversity in the backgrounds and
personalities of the investigators, as discussed below under the environments of theory. The role
of fundamental questions was discussed at the beginning of this section. Lateral thinking is a form
of educable creative intelligence presented most
clearly by de Bono (1990a). It is particularly useful when coupled with the methodological skill
of volitionally shifting one’s mode of thinking,
the most well known examples being those in de
Bono’s (1990b) six-thinking-hats idiom (Appendix). But this methodological skill, so ably promoted by de Bono, is useful within all of the ‘tool’
boxes in Figure 4.

Development of the Practice and the Practitioner: A Note on Skill Acquisition and
Techniques

Though this essay is primarily concerned with
methods in the development of theory, a note on
some prerequisites for utilizing the methods is pertinent. Several important points can be made. (1)
Group effort and diverse collaboration is essential.
Mead (1964:265-266) discusses the central role of
small ‘clusters’ of interacting individuals in the evolution of ideas and the importance of “…creating
the conditions in which the appropriately gifted
can actually make a contribution…” rather than

Vol. 5 2001

Method for Theory

searching out and relying upon individual leaders.
De Bono’s (1990b) thinking hats technique (see
Appendix) can improve group communication
dynamics and productivity. (2) Creativity, imagination and lateral thinking should be encouraged.
(3) Taboos or prejudices about proper communication modes should be discarded if it is in the
interest of furthering theory. For example, the nar-
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rative form is poorly suited to describing networks
of interactions in ecosystems. Graphical representations have multiple advantages (see Table 3).
Foremost among these is the skilled reader’s ability
to see a nearly simultaneous analytic and synthetic
understanding of the system portrayed. Though
descriptive diagrams/ illuminations are not traditional forms of communication in most schools of

TABLE 3. SOME PRINCIPLES OF CONCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN GRAPHICS (From Stepp 1999:49).11
Principles

Explanatory Notes

1) Memory:
–short-term memory unloaded

Short-term memory limitations are bypassed to the advantage of
processing

–long-term memory enhanced

Long-term memory is shifted from rote to gist

–signs are more memorable

Memorability is enhanced through iconography, i.e., graphical
"figures of speech" (e.g., metonymy), plus key words and phrases

2) Externalized Problem Solving:
–allows ease of manipulation

Constructed externalizations, particularly icons, invite imaginative
manipulations

–guides reader/viewer interpretation

Externalization plays a key role in completing any cognitive task

–near simultaneously analytic and
synthetic

Takes advantage of high-speed visual capabilities for resolving and
interpreting complex relationships

3) Semiotic Structure:
–simultaneously layered

Concurrent elements at the sublexical, lexical and grammatical levels;
co-occurrence and multilayering are the pervasive structural
principles

–hierarchical (graphical) vs. linear
(text)

Flexibility of levels of entry into graphics, as well as flexibility in
directional processing

–transparency

Pellucidity enhanced through simultaneous views, topography,
perspective and apparent movement

–emergent properties

Graphical formulations (including higher maths) are complex
constructs whose implications their creators only partially anticipate;
their unpredicted properties lie well beyond the scope of narrative,
closer to the heart of lateral thinking (de Bono 1990a)

4) Graphic Literacy Skills:

11

–input and output competence

Consumer-producer competence can be graded from knowledge, to
know-how, to skill

–rights as reader, rights as creator

The implicit contract is that both reader/viewer and creator/producer
will continually upgrade their levelsof comprehension and expression

Sources: Brainerd and Reyna (1990), Hutchins (1995), Johnson (1987), Lock and Peters (1996), Scaife and Rogers
(1996), Winn (1993), Zarger (1998), Zhang and Norman (1994).
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anthropology their use is recommended because
of the heuristic advantages they confer. This means
that practitioners are held responsible for developing their skill in reading and communicating in
new, possibly unconventional modes.Other examples are humor, cartoons, and satire.

F. THEORY AND ITS
ENVIRONMENTS
Constraint and Objectivity in Ecological
Integration
To pursue radical integration and to bring together
disparate paradigms, it is necessary to determine
how paradigms, theories, and theoretical practices
themselves constrain integration, and how those
constraints may be overcome.
Two sources of constraints inject bias into the
Academy: 1) bias that originates in society at large;
and 2) bias that operates within the intellectual
community. These constraints (often in the form
of hidden assumptions) act as filters and control
gates that influence intellectual thought and exchange. Within the Academy there are three additional overlapping kinds of sociological constraints
on integration: 1) scholasticism, ‘schools’ of training, lineages that share approach, subject matter,
publication outlets, and desired rewards; 2) methodological philosophy, including experimental vs.
comparative, search for a single cause vs. evaluate
spectra, hierarchical vs. single level, broad vs. specific methodologies; and 3) personality of individual researchers, with biases toward criticism vs.
construction, quantification vs. qualitative analysis, creative expression vs. technical, practical vs.
conceptual, and so on.
Different ontogenetic stages (explicitness),
different currencies, and degree of difference between the objects being integrated all are potential constraints on the integration of concepts with
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phenomena, theory with theory, paradigm with
paradigm, or hierarchical integration of any of
these.

Investigative Objectivity and Changes
in Paradigm
Objectivity has two immediate sources. One resides in the open-ended procedures that are applied to relating theoretical constructs to observable phenomena (Figure 4). Multifaceted methodological tools, including rules of evidence,
deconstruction, and multiple working hypotheses,
act as cross-checks, help to specify limits to knowledge, and contextualize biases. Such procedures
encourage the individual to take a more distanced
view, particularizing their accomplishments within
evolutionary, historical, and cross-cultural perspectives. It may be recognized that no one’s theory is
able to explain certain sets of observable phenomena. On the other hand, when two or more theories are apparently accurate, coherent, and fruitful, it may be possible to combine them into a
new paradigm. The second immediate source of
objectivity resides in the diversity of the investigative community (Longino 1990). Reduction of
bias is enhanced by the participation of investigators with different intellectual proclivities and cultural backgrounds. This is important, for example,
in identifying previously understated, unstated, or
unsuspected background assumptions. This kind
of analysis may be critical for the open scrutiny of
social biases, for recognizing the construction of
power relations in dominant discourses, and for
shifting paradigms in new and creative ways.
The next section of this essay represents an
attempt to mobilize the kind of method-for-theory
we have summarized above in the service of furthering integration and theory building in human
ecology, particularly as it applies to human ecosystems.
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SECTION II.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF
HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS
Section II uses the method-for-theory outlined in
Section I to attempt to begin construction of a
theory of human ecosystems. The rationale for
seeking integration and synthesis is explored first,
and some of the motivating questions are identified. Then, following the anatomy of theory outlined in Section I, we systematically go through
some of the components that we have identified as
starting points for the development of a theory of
human ecosystems. This is a preliminary effort to
bring together relevant pieces of disparate research
and ideas to show the value of having a clear grasp
of the methodology behind the development of
theory, and to promote holistic thinking among
students of human ecology. Further work is obviously necessary before a coherent working theory
of human ecosystems can be developed.

A. INTEGRATION AND
SYNTHESIS IN HUMAN
ECOLOGY
Our motivation for promoting synthesis in human
ecology is premised on the recognition that information flow is as central to understanding human
systems as matter and energy flows. Our premise
is that a truly human ecology should be responsible for the integration of both sociocultural ecology (traditionally the domain of the humanities)
and biophysical ecology (traditionally dominated
by the so-called ‘natural sciences’). The history of
human ecology’s disciplinary development has led
to increasing division of labor and fragmentation
of knowledge, often delimiting potential knowhow and restricting the scope of skill acquisition.
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This has sometimes resulted in such specialized
worldviews that practitioners can not share common vocabularies or conceptualizations (for example, the anthropology department at Stanford
University dividing into two departments: cultural
and social anthropology vs. anthropological ‘sciences’). On the other hand, the focus resulting from
specialization within human ecology has resulted
in considerable refinement of knowledge within
each restricted domain. The discipline as a whole,
then, appears in need of synthetic integration.
There have been several calls for just such an
effort in human ecology. Redman, Grove and Kuby
(n.d.) state that “[a]lthough it is not novel to recognize the interconnectedness of humans and
the[ir] environment[s] (cf. Marsh 1864; Thomas
1956), constructing a new approach emphasizing
an integrative framework equipped with comprehensive models, reinforcing methods, and complementary data is a growing and urgent priority.”
Scoones (1999) reviews the potential cross-fertilization of social science and ecological thinking,
identifying several research topics in social science
that actively use the principles of dynamic equilibrium, spatial and temporal variation, complexity
and uncertainty, including historical ecology,
‘structuration’ or contextual/interactionist perspectives, and complexity in socio-ecological systems.
Our own view, that a truly holistic approach to
understanding human ecosystems must recognize
and investigate the central role of information, was
articulated almost thirty years ago by Flannery
(1972:400):
Up until now, it has mainly been the humanists
who have studied the informational aspects of
complex societies—art, religion, ritual, writing
systems, and so on. The ‘ecologists’ have largely
contented themselves with studying exchanges of
matter and energy…humanists must cease
thinking that ecology ‘dehumanizes’ history, and
ecologists must cease to regard art, religion, and
ideology as mere ‘epiphenomena’ without causal
significance. In an ecosystem approach to the
analysis of human societies, everything which
transmits information is within the province of
ecology.
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Go back to the Introduction to this essay and look
at Figures 1a, b, c, d and e again. Keep our goal of
integrating biophysical and sociocultural ecology
in mind as you read the following proposed framework for a theory of human ecosystems.

Radical Synthesis

A partially nested hierarchy of paradigms relevant
to human ecology can be seen in Box 4. What
would be the nature of potential integration across
these contrasting paradigms?
For example, population and ecosystem paradigms historically represent two apparently opposed approaches within bioecology (Box 5). These
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paradigms can also be applied to ecological anthropology (Figure 10). A recognition that populations
function as parts of ecosystems is a potential point
of integration. The ecosystem is the most inclusive ecological conceptualization at any given level
in the ecohierarchy. But because it is holistic, it is
also difficult to achieve conceptually. Conceptual
stumbling blocks include the prevalence of diffuse
causality, indeterminism and the difficulties of
bounding variables and systems.
In addition to being part of natural ecosystems (sensu lato), humans also define themselves
by their worldviews (± praxis) as part of constructed
world systems. This results in a hierarchy of hu-

BOX 4. PARTIAL NESTING OF SOME PARADIGMS RELEVANT TO HUMAN ECOLOGY AND SOME OF
THEIR KEY CHARACTERISTICS (Concept based on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 7.1).
Academic Paradigms relevant to the study of ecosystems
Holism
Evolution
Historical Process (La Longue Durée)
Systems Theory
Anthropological Paradigms relevant to Human Ecology sensu lato
Structuralism
World Systems Analysis
Political Economy (Marxist Anthropology)
Population Ecology (Demography)
Identity (Cultural Studies)
Kinship and Ethnicity
Interpretive and Symbolic Anthropology
Ecological Anthropological Paradigms relevant to the study of Human Ecosystems
Cultural Ecology (Functional Materialism)
Political Ecology (Expanding Contextualization)
Ethnoecology
Historical Ecology
Biocultural Studies
Evolutionary Ecology (Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness)
Analysis of Environmental Discourse
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BOX 5. DEFINITIONS OF BIOECOLOGY: POPULATION VS. ECOSYSTEMS (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and
Jones 1994, Box 1.1).

Population Paradigm
The study of interrelationships between organisms and their surroundings (Ricklefs 1977). The study of
the interactions that determine the distribution and abundance of organisms (Krebs 1978).
Ecosystem Paradigm
The study of the structure and function of nature (Odum 1971), particularly the patterns of matter and
energy flow.
Toward Integration
Populations are conceived as parts of ecosystems. Thus, a holistic bioecology would entail the study of
the relationships between organism variation and the flow of matter and energy among organisms, systems, and their multiple environments.

man ecological levels something like that depicted
in Table 1. Human ecosystems may be recognized
at each of these levels, a potential starting place
for conceptual integration across subdisciplinary
paradigms. The central role of information in human ecology makes such integration more plausible than it would be in biological ecology, where
the integrative potential may have to come from
focusing on questions that lie at the intersection
of the subdisciplines, questions that cannot be addressed by either of the two paradigms already
described acting alone.
In the development of an integrated theory
of human ecosystems, it is important to remember that no single objective of theory takes precedence over all the others. Every theoretical objective contributes to the dialog of understanding.
This pluralistic view should help alleviate unproductive and damaging debate about what single
method is best. Moreover, a theory of human ecosystems could at once be evolutionary/historical,
dynamic/dialectical, abstract/empirical and general/specific (Table 2). In restricted domains, critical theory, for example, might be self-contradictory and still contribute to understanding.

Fundamental Questions for an Integrated
Human Ecology

In order to radically integrate sociocultural ecology and biophysical ecology, it is necessary to identify fundamental questions that might motivate or
‘drive’ this effort. Examples of such fundamental
integrating questions might include the following.
To what extent are the causes of modern human ills inherent to the nature of our socio-cultural systems (Robbins 1999:ix)? Related to this,
why do humans persist in destroying the life-support systems of the planet (Shepard 1982:1)? At
best, will the next millenium see the conversion of
a biologically diverse planet into a completely human-dominated noösphere (cf. Wyndham
2000:87)? Questions such as these may be addressed a number of ways at a number of levels.
Perhaps new theoretical components are required
to successfully address these questions, components
that would not be recognized as relevant otherwise.
Ultimate (or historically distant) causalities, as opposed to proximate causalities, may be involved,
separated from considerations of system function
and the ontogeny of reproducing patterns of daily
life. Addressing these questions systematically may
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FIGURE 10. ECOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: SUBDISCIPLINARY MOIETIES (Inspired by an unpublished diagram by
G.W. Barrett depicting the population and ecosystem approaches in biological ecology).

In ecological anthropology the population and ecosystem approaches are only partially developed, but the
strength of the discipline as a whole lies in the breadth of its subject domains, ranging from small-scale
societies (many of which are only known archaeologically) to the modern world system. The traditional
approach to integrating the information provided by the different subdisciplines is an additive one of combining findings into a narrative description of human variation.
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force us to challenge the completeness, applicability or coherence of current theory, leading us to
encompass components or relationships well outside currently accepted domains of explanation and
understanding.
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ily reify unit or system stability; allowance for flexibility in required time/money/effort; demonstration of practicality of results to lay people (policy
makers); and better understanding of dynamism
as well as stasis and persistence.

Methodological Tools for Investigating the Marxian Method
Complexity of Human Ecosystems
In the Marxian method, priority is given to the
Methodological tools are designed to effectively
relate conceptual constructs to observable phenomena (Figure 4). Some of the methodological tools
(m-tools) listed in Figure 4 that are most relevant
to the construction of a theory of human ecosystems include the following.

Expanding Contextualization
While used here for theoretical purposes, the
method has applied beginnings in the East
Kalimantan project of UNESCO’s Man and the
Biosphere program (Vayda 1983). For this project,
units of analysis were sought by analyzing the social or spatial system by which resources were managed (Vayda 1983:267). To do this, initially a system of a small size was bounded, then made wider
and wider or denser and denser (Vayda 1983:265).
The strengths of expanding contextualization include: avoidance of assumptions that unnecessar-

‘How’ (Box 6). Historical materialism creates “...an
understanding of social and structural conditions
based on internal relations of entailment rather
than external ones of cause” (McKinlay and Taylor 1998), such that cause and effect become interchangeable (Harvey 1996:54). The role of theory
is not to predict, but to explain through a set of
generative and transformative principles that reveal possibilities. “The purpose of materialist inquiry is not to test...but to show...forms...
domains...effects and transformative possibilities...The
problem is to explore the forms and domains of
operation” (Harvey 1996:67). Harvey’s dialectical
method closely parallels our system analysis, with
emphasis on understanding processes, flows, fluxes
and relations rather than on elements, content,
things, fixed structures and static organizations.
The dialectic (see Figure 4, methodological tools)
prioritizes a search for fundamentally contradic-

BOX 6. MARXIAN METHOD (After Harvey 1996).
In Marxian methodology, priority is given to ‘the how.’
Questions take forms such as:
• can we show...
• are there circumstances that require us to rethink…
• can we track.... and what does this mean...
• what happens if...
• in what ways...
• and in what respects can this be regarded as... (Harvey 1996:67)
For method in building theory, we encourage the avoidance/rejection of the following Marxian
assumptions and practices:
• inevitability of evolutionary historical processes
• exclusive role of the dialectic in causing evolutionary transformations
• privileged status of the working class (proletariat) as an historical agency
• ad hoc use of the concept of false consciousness to explain unsuccessful predictions
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tory forces. For human systems, dialectical fields
can be informational with associated material/energy sinks, as well as the creative dialectics identified in Marxian (and Hegelian) methodology. In
the former case, increasing amounts of energy may
be dumped into points of structural contradiction
in a human system, and these may become runaway sinks. In a ‘bubble’ economy, for example,
governments will often keep throwing money at
fear to boost ‘consumer confidence’ even though
it is explicitly recognized that the market ‘value’ is
drastically inflated relative to real production.
Postmodern Method
Postmodern and poststructural theorists are decidedly against grand theory, integration and universalism, yet there are several valuable methodological insights that a developing theory of human ecosystems can borrow from postmodern thought
(Box 7). The postmodern position advocates criti-
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cal social theory that analyzes and deconstructs the
historical basis for our discourse/practice, our notions of truth and modes of intellectual domination, thereby hopefully undermining their appearance as the natural, i.e., inevitable, outcome of sociocultural evolution (cf. Poster 1984:159). This
point of view provides valuable shifts in methodological perspective that forces us to continually
recognize the constructed nature of theory itself.
Also, the production and reproduction of ‘power,’
a central theme in postmodern and poststructural
analyses (cf. Russell 1938; Foucault 1972; Jameson
1991), is clearly relevant to the evolution of human ecosystems.
Causality
The targets and some of the aspects of causal explanation are shown in Box 8. Causalities may be
conceptualized in a number of ways, including direct, indirect, ultimate and proximate.

BOX 7. POSTMODERN METHOD (After McKinlay and Starkey 1998).
Similar to the Marxian approach, priority in this method is given to “the how” (Deetz 1998:153). But the
objective of postmodern methodology is to uncover the rules that regulate and govern social practices that
are unknown to the actors involved. To do so:
• use is made of jarring or shocking images to force us to see the ordinary with fresh vision, to
confront the strangeness of the familiar (McKinlay and Starkey 1998:5)
• the subject is taken from its central position (Burrell 1998:22)
• the ideas of human progress and enlightenment are questioned (Burrell 1998:22)
• care is given to the meaning of small details, including the attempt to record accidents, chance
and lies (Burrell 1998:22)
The Deconstructive Gesture
The essence of the deconstructive gesture (via Derrida) is to investigate the relationship between explicit
and hidden textual levels; to discover the limits of the text in order to “...understand the extent to which a
text’s objectivity and persuasiveness depend on a set of strategic exclusions” (McKinlay and Starkey
1998:11), or, why certain themes are never questioned, whereas others are condemned.
As a method for building theory, we suggest avoidance/ rejection of the following postmodern procedures:
• self contradiction, willful obscurantism and a determination to avoid totalizing at all costs
(McKinlay and Starkey 1998:5)
• a “...complex, convoluted writing style...self-consciously adopted to escape from what is seen as
the limitation and constraints of ‘clear prose’” (Burrell 1998:15)
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BOX 8. TARGETS AND ASPECTS OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 2.2
Reproduced with permission of publisher).

Phenomena—observable events, entities or relationships of interest
Patterns—repeated events, recurring entities, replicated relationships, or smooth or erratic trajectories
observed in time or space
Process—subset of phenomena in which events follow one another in time or space: these may or may
not be causally connected
Cause—necessary entailment of one event or structure by another event or structure
Mechanism—a subset of cause: refers to a direct interaction that results in a phenomenon

The Aristotelian conceptualization of causality consists of four main components: material,
efficient (mechanical), formal and final (Table 4).
Three of the four causes work at different levels of
scale, and can be considered to be hierarchical in
nature (see Figure 11). The efficient cause will act
on a small field of influence. The formal cause
operates at the ‘focal’ level of observation. Events
will transpire under conditions constrained and
permitted by the final agents of causality
(Ulanowicz 1997). Newton’s Principia led to the
dominance of the mechanical form of efficient
cause in the physical sciences (Ulanowicz 1997).
In the sciences influenced by Darwinian biology,
however, final cause (based on purpose or design)

dominates in the development of theoretical explanation (Gleick 1987:201). This is true of functionalist and materialist anthropology too, as seen
in the search for final causes that explain cannibalism, religious practices, etc. and in the recent enthusiasm for evolutionary psychology’s explanations of modern social behavior. Care must be taken
to avoid preconceiving the kind of causality relevant to systems of interest; in most cases it is likely
that at least both efficient and final causality play
important roles.
Causation may also be either direct or indirect. Patten (n.d.) discusses both direct and indirect causation. Transactions are the observable
transfers of resources between organisms. Relations

TABLE 4. ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL CATEGORIES AND SOME EXAMPLES (Adapted from
Ulanowicz 1997).
CAUSAL TYPE

Example 1: Building a House

Example 2: Writing about
Information Ecology12

MATERIAL

Wood, mortar, stones, brick, etc.

Paper, ink, ideas, etc.

EFFICIENT

Carpenters, plumbers, etc.

Information ecologists

FORMAL

Blueprints

Chapter outlines

FINAL

Need for shelter

Perception of limitations in human
ecology's understanding of human
ecosystems

12

For discussion see “Prospectus for Information Ecology” (Stepp 1999).
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UPPER LEVEL
(Final Causality)
-------------------------------FOCAL LEVEL
(Formal Causality)
-------------------------------(Efficient Causality)
LOWER LEVEL
FIGURE 11. THE TRIADIC VIEW OF CAUSALITIES
WITHIN SYSTEMS SCIENCE (Adapted from
Ulanowicz 1997).

The formal causes operate at the focal level,
while efficient causes operate from below. Final
causes are imposed from above.

are the direct and indirect consequences of transactions. Indirectness is a separation between the
organisms, a lack of direct connections between
them. Indirect effects may influence a system
through transactions that are not directly linked.
Indirect causality is more important than direct
causality in complex ecological systems (Patten n.d.).
Ultimate forms of causality refer to inherited
structures or enabling and constraining conditions
whose origins can be traced deep into the past. In
order to understand present structures/systems (cultural, social, biological, physical) one must identify not only their genesis and context, but also
their evolutionary histories. Figure 12 depicts some
important features of historical transformation.
Initial conditions set the stage; boundary conditions restrict potential outcomes; and transformations rupture systems to effect significant change
and mark periods of ‘internal logic.’ Internally,
priority effects and echoes of the past provide historical continuity.
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Hypothesis Testing
Theories that attempt universal explanations of
human ecosystem phenomena are subject to a wide
range of scale limitations that affect our ability to
derive testable hypotheses (Table 5). Currently it
is not possible for the individual researcher to judge
the success of theory that forecasts or predicts over
a very broad time scale or world system spatial
framework. Creative attempts to transcend time/
space compression and limitations of the individual
observer include, for example, historical fiction and
predictions based on thought experiments that incorporate current data into science fiction. Depending on the framework in question we find various shortcuts used in testing hypotheses.
The dominant mode of testing is the comparative method (Box 9), in which complex,
multicausal models are subject to varieties of evidence. The conclusions drawn are usually probabilistic and contingent (Box 10). Because of the
immature development of practitioner and theory
in human ecology, predictions often seem riskier
(Box 11) than conventional forecasting and prediction in other (non-human) fields of study.

BOX 9. MODES OF TESTING (Modified
somewhat from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994,
Box 2.3).

Experiment—manipulation of a system
(e.g., organism) to generate a reference state
or dynamic of known and repeatable characteristics
Comparison—examination of
unmanipulated systems to determine their
likeness or contrast in state or dynamics
Correlation—statistical relationship between measurements of two properties of
systems
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FUTURE

PRESENT
PAST

Internal Logic
X-3

Transformation 3

PAST

Internal Logic
X-2

Transformation 2

PAST

Internal Logic
X-1

Transformation 1

INITIAL CONDITIONS

FIGURE 12. ULTIMATE CAUSALITY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 7.4
[Originally Pickett 1991]).

This figure depicts the (causal) role of the past in enabling and constraining present and
future conditions of ecosystems (applicable to any environment but especially the cultural
and social). It employs a Braudelian (1980) view of historical transformations which, in
combination with echoes from the past (such as features from the ancient regime), interact with internal logics of the time to produce contemporary conditions. Priority effects,
or core principles (for discussion see Hallpike 1988) are persistent structures (e.g., cognitive, behavioral, social) that strongly influence historical development. Disjunctures
imposed by historical transformations often create identifiable periods of social logics
(‘Internal Logics’) that are marked as such in the record (e.g., the European ‘Age of Reason’). Boundary conditions (such as carrying capacity, cognitive potential, fertility and
mortality) and initial conditions constrain possible outcomes.
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TABLE 5. HYPOTHESIS TESTING POSSIBILITIES: ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND OBSERVER MORTALITY.

Ecological
Level

Space/Time
Matrix

Coarse scale

WORLD
SYSTEM

Long term and
Increasingly Complex
E.g. Long waves of
capitalism and technology
vs. revolutions
(transformations in
structure)

Means of
Forecast and/or
Prediction

Time Scale for Data
Recovery:
Testing Hypotheses and
Attempts at Circumventing
Temporal Restrictions

Forecasting through
projection of current states
or alternatives into the
future (e.g. science fiction)

Decades to centuries for
testing (often revisionist
historical analysis is
employed)

Predictions from thought
experiments and mental
models

Short cuts attempted with
place-for-time substitutions
(e.g. 20th century huntergatherers are assumed to be
analogous to an earlier stage
x in human evolutionary
history)

Retrodiction with historical
fiction (comparative
statics)
Revolutions unpredictable?
Extrapolation from past
periodicity/ trends or
system relationships. (e.g.
Kondriatieff cycles)

Moderate scale

POPULATION

Easier to forecast than
World Systems

Moderate complexity
Computer simulations of
alternative possibilities

Fine scale

INDIVIDUAL

Short term
Involutional levels of
psychological complexity

Predictions based on
knowledge of identity,
physiology, cognition,
ontogeny, etc.
Questions of free-will arise
(e.g. existential stance)

Years to decades
Short cuts attempted with
trend analysis

Months to years
Short cuts attempted with
cross-sectional studies as
substitutes for longitudinal
studies
Maximization of use of
panoptic technologies as a
way to continuously observe
subjects (e.g. video, tapped
phone lines, surveillance)
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BOX 10. CONTRASTING REALMS OF TESTING (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box
2.4).

Falsification
Specific models or hypotheses
Narrow domain
Tightly designed experiments
Univariate models
Logical necessity of outcome
Simple concepts of evidence
Prone to Type I error13
Opportunity to reject contingent answers
13

Verification
Complex compound models or theories
Broad domain
Natural patterns or complex experiments
Multicausal models
Probabilistic outcome
Complex concepts of evidence
Prone to Type II error13
Opportunity to confirm or introduce doubt

See Schrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993 for discussion.

Multiple Working Hypotheses
Chamberlin (1890, 1965) offers an important
methodological discussion that can be partly summarized as follows. Hasty explanation quickly leads
to the development of tentative theory. With unconscious bias, a favored tentative theory rapidly
passes into an adopted theory, and then on to a
ruling theory. The defects of this common chain
of events have led historically to both the condemnation of theorizing in general, and to the method
of the working hypothesis. Unfortunately, a working hypothesis easily becomes a controlling idea.
To guard against this, Chamberlin urged the
method of multiple working hypotheses. He points
out that one of the chief merits of this method is
that it encourages the development of complex explanations, with multiple causalities. The method
also promotes thoroughness and a habit of parallel
or complex thought wherein the practitioner appears capable of simultaneous vision from different standpoints. Phenomena appear to be viewed
analytically and synthetically at once. He further
notes that this type of complex thought cannot be
expressed verbally in words, and that words and
thoughts lose the close association that they usually maintain with those whose silent thoughts, as

BOX 11. KINDS AND FEATURES OF EXPECTATION (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994, Box 2.5. Reproduced with permission of publisher)
Prediction—a statement of expectation
deduced from the logical structure or
derived from the causal structure of a
theory
Forecast—a projection of current trends
or conditions into the future: such an
expectation may not necessarily be
derived from a theory
Safe predictions—those within the
confirmed domain of a theory which, if
incorrect, would not threaten the basic
content or structure of the theory
Risky predictions—those outside the
confirmed domain of a theory which
would, if incorrect, bring down part or
all of a theory; such predictions probe
the limits of a theory
Classification—expectations of a group
membership based on similarity or
difference in state or dynamics of
phenomena
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well as spoken thoughts, run in linear verbal
courses. He confesses that one drawback of the
method is that it introduces that difficulty in expression, and concludes that therefore there is a
certain predisposition on the part of the practitioner to taciturnity. We should note that in the late
1800s, when Chamberlin wrote, graphical models
had not yet been developed to the point where they
could be used to express the kind of complex scientific thought that he knew so well from his own
personal experience.
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Concepts of Evidence
Concepts of evidence (Box 12) are the ways-andmeans that allow for confirmation and rejection
of the empirical content of theory, i.e. facts and
well-established generalizations. The focal mode
of thinking is white hat, the ‘checking and re-checking mode’ (see Appendix), in which it is important to specify limits to knowledge and common
sources of error in judgement. Consilience with
the D.I.F. criteria (Diversity, Independence, Fit, see
Box 12) is the ultimate standard.

BOX 12. CONCEPTS OF EVIDENCE (Based in part on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 2.6,
plus Lloyd 1988).
Direct—including physical objects and eyewitness observations (vs. hearsay)
Indirect—by inference (circumstantial)
Expert Testimony—technical or other specialized judgements
Limits to Knowledge—recognition of limitations and common sources of error
Consilience
––convergence of different lines of evidence toward a unified conclusion
––accordance of two or more inferences drawn from different groups of phenomena
Diversity—variety in kinds of evidence
Independence—lines of evidence with separate origins
Fit—degree of accordance between expectations and outcomes/observations
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B. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY
OF HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS
In previous sections, we detailed the general nature of theory and its methodological applications.
Now we attempt to use these methods to mobilize
an intuitive theory of human ecosystems. We begin with the identification of theoretical components. (For explanation of the role of each component refer back to the Anatomy of Theory in Section I). We hope that by laying these out in an
explicit though immature theoretical frame, we can
illustrate the potential of holistic integration, provoke new ideas and invite contributions to theoretical development.

Basic Conceptual Components of Human
Ecosystem Theory
Assumptions
Systems Comparability
One of the underlying assumptions of a theory of
human ecosystems that seeks to integrate biophysical ecology and sociocultural ecology is that these
are comparable systems. It is assumed that the heuristic device we call systems analysis uncovers common and interacting properties of both that yield
fruitful insights. This assumption may become an
accepted fact once it is fully recognized and initially tested.

53

Hyperfunctionalism
A strong assumption that underlies traditional
human ecology is that of hyperfunctionalism, especially pseudo-Darwinian application of the concepts of fitness and adaptation. Contrary to this
assumption, it has been recognized that culture is
not inherently adaptive (rather, it may be hypofunctional), and many institutions do not exist
primarily because they are useful (Hallpike 1988:
22). Particularly, a cultural trait’s frequency and
survival can owe more to its relatively easy social
reproduction and the fact that it can be used to
muddle through a variety of circumstances, rather
than any adaptive efficiency (cf. Figure 12). For
many institutions this can result in “survival of the
mediocre” (Hallpike 1988: vi). In an integrated
human ecology, a priori assumptions of functional
efficiency and notions of human progress are no
longer philosophically acceptable as unproblematic.
However, it is essential to recognize them while in
the process of developing theory, because unrecognized assumptions (confirmed or falsified) can
create confusion and waste time.

Definitions
Because language is our primary mode of communication, any attempt by humans to integrate
theory from multiple disciplines must carefully
define terms. If terms are poorly defined, much
time is wasted arguing at cross-purposes in lowgrade communication. Some definitions essential
to building a theory of human ecosystems include
Continuity
There are underlying commonalities to all human the following.
ecosystems that begin in the Upper Paleolithic and
continue through postmodernity. These common- System
alities are reworked and given new expression with A set or assemblage of things, associated, connected
every major transformation in human history. Per- or interdependent, so as to form a complex whole
haps the most important of these is pursuit of the (Onions 1986). For human ecosystems the definisupernatural. (See Core Vectors in Confirmed Gen- tion of system boundaries is often fluid and changeable depending on the focus of interest. Thus, in
eralizations, below.)
the same analysis, an organism might be bounded
at the outer limits of its skin and later include its
Emergent Properties and Holism
Emergent properties of human ecosystems are tools or built environment. The key is to set the
manifested in ways that cannot be predicted on boundaries of the system in ways that allow the
the basis of the addition of individual parts alone. symptoms of interest to be fully expressed. To be
Holistic analysis takes the stance that a whole is effective in analysis these boundary shifts must be
clearly stated.
more than the sum of its parts.
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Environment: Population View
From a population perspective, Andrewartha and
Birch (1984) provide a Darwinian theory of the
environment (Figure 13). Taking the individual
organism (or a population of organisms) as the focal
point, the environment consists of everything that
might influence its chance to survive and reproduce. Functionally the environment can be divided
into directly acting components (the centrum) and
indirectly acting components (the web). The centrum
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is comprised of proximate causes. The four divisions of the centrum emphasized by
Andrewartha and Birch (1984) are mates, predators, resources and malentities. The web is comprised of branching chains of indirect influences,
the links in a chain being a living organism (or
its artifact or residue) or inorganic matter or
energy. The ecosystem construct modifies this
concept of environment.

FIGURE 13. ENVIRONMENT AS CENTRUM AND WEB (Simplified from Andrewartha and Birch
1984, Fig. 1.01).

Proximate causes of changes in the physiology or behavior of an organism are placed in
the centrum and recognized as directly acting components of environment; beyond the
centrum everything else is part of the web of components that act indirectly through an
intermediary or chain of intermediaries that ultimately influence one or another of the
components in the centrum.
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Environment: Ecosystem View
From an ecosystem point-of-view, Patten (1978)
distinguishes between input environment and output environment (Figure 14). Ecosystem is defined
as IE+S+OE (Input Environment + System + Output Environment). In addition, Patten’s concept
of ecosystem recognizes the significance of indirect causality and the importance of information
flows in ecosystems.
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Noösphere
The noösphere is the world transformed by humans and human thought. It is produced and
maintained by increasing complexity of human
interaction in cultural, social, biological and physical environments (see references in Wyndham
2000:87; and also the center illustration by
Duranceau in this volume).

FIGURE 14. ENVIRONMENT AND ECOSYSTEM (Redrawn from E. P. Odum 1983; concept based on
Patten 1978).

There are two environments, an input environment and an output environment, defined by
the focal animal or system; altogether they define the ecosystem: IE+S+OE=ECOSYSTEM.
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Concepts
Human Ecosystem
The human ecosystem concept adopted here is
based on Patten’s ideas (including the idea of filters/screens), combined with the concept of multiple environments (see Figure 15). Thus a human
system can be thought of as a locus in a set of environments, which together with inputs and outputs
constitute a human ecosystem. This concept can
be expanded to a scaled hierarchy of human ecosystems (Figure 16).
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We recognize the central role of information
in human ecosystems. This is the starting point
for most if not all identified observations, facts,
confirmed generalizations and hypotheses developed to date.
According to Wilkinson (1995), with the evolutionary emergence of the nation-state, human
ecosystems must be defined as entailing at least two
somewhat independent state-level civilizations that
are geographically separated, periodically hostile,

FIGURE 15. PARTIAL CONCEPT OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS AND THE HUMAN ECOSYSTEM
(Cover, Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology 1997).

Concentric spheres denote an evolutionary arrangement of the different environments,
with an aggregated consumer symbol at the center. Information inputs and outputs to
and from the system pass through epistemological filter/field/editor/screens.
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FIGURE 16. PARTIAL CONCEPT OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS APPLIED TO A SCALED HIERARCHY
OF HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS.
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FIGURE 17. WORLD SYSTEM OF COMPETING NATION STATES (Concept based on Wilkinson
1995).

Central Civilization defined as the interaction of competing nation-states. The statelevel human ecosystem is minimally made up of two competing nation-states. The flows
are information and materials.
and competing socio-cultural systems (Figure 17).
It is the interaction and interrelationship of competing nation-states (Wilkinson’s Central Civilization), including warfare, that maintains nationstate human ecosystemic structure and function.
Note that the definition of pre-nation-state human
ecosystems may or may not incorporate Wilkinson’s
principle.
Evolution
Diverse possible evolutionary outcomes are often
overlooked in theory. Table 6 depicts a scheme
relating mode and tempo of evolution in such a
way as to clarify the concept, particularly in light
of dichotomous debates regarding the nature of
evolution, whether physical, biological, social or
cultural. Ecosystem evolution may tend to result
in networked mutualisms dependent more on in-

direct than direct causality (see Jorgensen
1992:340).
Hierarchy and Scale
The conceptual skills for traversing hierarchy and
scale with ease must be acquired for application of
human ecosystems theory to different organizational levels and temporal junctures (for a thorough treatment see Allen and Hoekstra 1992). This
entails skill at recognizing parts of a system (e.g.,
cells) and then subsuming the parts into larger systems (e.g., individuals) which themselves become
subsystems of still larger systems (e.g., communities, nations) and so on. Systems at different scales
may exhibit different properties. Braudel’s (1980)
longue durée of human history is one example of
the heuristic value of situating event histories
within larger structural patterns over time.
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Paradoxical Ontologies, Strange Loops and
Perverse Functions
Paradoxes and perversities are ubiquitous in human systems (cf. Smith and Berg 1987). Specifically, we have identified these as ‘paradoxical ontologies’ and ‘perverse functions.’ A paradox is
defined in early usage (c.1570) as a statement or
condition that is apparently self-contradictory, but
possibly true. Bateson (2000) casts a paradox as a
question that requires us to take sides—both sides
at once (the ‘double bind’). In any case, paradoxical ontologies exist throughout hierarchical levels
in any system, expressed in many ways, including
visual art and ritual systems. Paradoxical ontologies are a primary function of being human.
Graphic representations expressing complexity of-
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ten incorporate paradoxes and contradictions, depicted as ‘strange loops’ or tangled hierarchies
(Wilden 1986). Wilden identifies the paradoxical
characteristics of human information environments
as semiotic oscillation. As our brains attempt to
reconcile contradictory information, visual input
and cognitive processing oscillate back and forth
between the two simultaneous but apparently contradictory interpretations. A related category is that
of perverse function, characterized by irony and
juxtaposition. Perverse functions are a secondary
characteristic of humans acting together in complex, socially constrained environments. Political
cartoons are typically commentaries on perverse
functions in contemporary society.

TABLE 6. SCHEME RELATING EVOLUTIONARY MODES AND TEMPOS: A PARTIAL MATRIX OF
POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS.

MODE
Non-Directional Change

Directional Change
(unfolding, progressive,
cumulative vs. cyclic)

Short Period
transmogrification

?

?

progressive
transformational
discontinuous

drift

????

drift

????

Long Period

Short Period
Long Period
Short Period
dynamic stability is the dominant process:
Long Period
the system maintains structure and identity;
‘stabilizing selection’
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Externalized Cognition
Externalized cognition is the externalization of
knowledge/cognition manifested in communicative signs, behavior or material artifacts. For humans, language is the most obvious form of externalized cognition, but the domain includes such
things as smoke signals, rolex watches, maps, art,
blitzkrieg, ritual acts, traffic signals and the abacus
(cf. Gumperz and Levinson 1991). Because of its
role in the evolution and maintenance of sociality,
externalized cognition can be considered a generative principle for human ecosystems. Complex social structures are based in part on the differential
distribution of externalized cognition (a Confirmed
Generalization).
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at the individual level is the ‘Born Again’ or conversion experience. Conversely, general system crises may provoke explicit recognition of previously
unacknowledged assumptions. For example, after
the 1929 U.S. stock market crash the role of consumer confidence and ‘belief in the system’ both
in creating and bursting financial bubbles became
common knowledge.

Accepted Facts
Humans Sacrifice Enormous Amounts of Wealth
in Pursuit of the Supernatural
In Iron Age Denmark, valuable enemy ships were
dragged inland and scuttled along with swords,
axes, and horses as offerings to lake deities in gratitude for victory in battle (Klesius 2000:31). The
Empirical Content Of Human Ecosystem Pharoahs of Egypt sequestered vast fortunes for
their voyages in the afterlife. Trillions of dollars have
Theory
been spent on space exploration, which serves ideological purposes for earthlings, inspiring faith in
Observations
the manifest destiny of our continual territorial exSystem Controls
Human (social) systems are not closed teleological pansion and our status as chosen capitalists-in-consystems controlled from outside, but are ecologi- trol-of-the-world-and-beyond. Are these seemingly
cal networks in dynamic interaction with other irrational expenditures the norm for all societies?
systems, including other social systems and biophysical systems. They have both centralized and Confirmed Generalizations
diffuse/varied control mechanisms (Patten and Causality in Complex Human Systems
Odum 1981; see Figure 1.b), apparently domi- Forrester (1969:9-10,110) provides some notes on
causality in complex human systems. He points
nated by indirect causality.
out that in complex systems cause and effect are
often not closely related in either time or space.
Insular Logic
All belief systems have an insular logic; i.e., they Further, apparent causes close in time to observed
are closed within the framework of their founda- symptoms are usually not true cause and effect retion assumptions, impervious to input not speci- lationships, but instead coincident symptoms arisfied as legitimate in advance. “… In this web of ing from the dynamics of system structure. He
belief every strand depends upon every other notes that for human social systems, causes are usustrand, and a [member of the cultural system] can- ally found, not in prior events, but in the structure
not get out of its meshes because it is the only world and policies of the system. These generalizations
[s]he knows” (Evans-Pritchard in Horton compliment Patten’s emphasis on the importance
1993:222). Insular logics are usually dynamic sys- of indirect causality in non-human ecosystems (see
tems; to understand one part an outsider must of- Causality, above).
Wallerstein (1999:1; following systems theory
ten make the effort to understand the whole. The
of
dissipative
structures cf. Prigogine 1984) posits
reorganization of insular logics may cause major
transformational disjunctures (in psychological and varying causal effects historically in human systems
social systems), particularly when foundational as- at different stages of development. For human syssumptions are effectively challenged. An example tems during phases of normal development, large

Vol. 5 2001

A Theory of Human Ecosystems

inputs have small outputs (i.e., it is difficult to
change the course of history), whereas during a
phase of demise (or bifurcation), small inputs have
large outputs (seemingly trivial events trigger drastic
change). Causal direction or outcome may be inherently unpredictable, especially during periods
of system demise.
Unique Properties of Human Ecosystems
Human systems demonstrate a number of unique
ecosystem properties, including the following. (1)
Human systems have internalized representations
of the system itself and can generate or reformulate goals for all or parts of the system (G. Bateson
in M.C. Bateson 1972:102). This adds reflexive
informational complexity to ecosystem analyses,
although it is unclear how effective internal direction is in the long-run. (2) Expression of the maximum power principle (see H.T. Odum 1983) by
modern human ecosystems on a global scale is increasingly destructive of biological and cultural
diversity. Global capitalism is the latest expression
of this vector.
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Derived Conceptual Components
Of Human Ecosystem Theory
Hypotheses
Examples of as-yet-untested hypotheses include the
following. (1) “The cybernetic nature of self and
the world tends to be imperceptible to consciousness” (G. Bateson, in M.C. Bateson 1972:16). Related to this is the (emic) perception of imagined
human environments as unlimited in resources and
lacking in even material feedback loops (i.e., we can
throw trash ‘away’). (2) With the advent of the nation-state, biophysical environments become
thought of as less and less important relative to
interpolity information interactions, which come to
dominate both input and output environments.

Models
A basic conceptual model for human ecosystems
is that of a system locus in multiple environments
(Figure 15). Information ‘flows’ in and between
physical, biological, social and cultural environments (a general evolutionary sequence). Information inputs and outputs are subject to epistemoCore Vectors of Human Ecosystem Evolution
logical filter/field/editor/screens, located both inAt least three core vectors are common processes side and at the outer boundaries of the system (see
in human ecosystem development. The human
Stepp 1999 for discussion).
practice of externalizing cognition (see Concepts,
above) is the generative principle underlying all of
Framework and Structure of Human
these vectors. The three core vectors interrelate
Ecosystem Theory
involutionally over time. (1) Technosubstitution: the
progressive substitution of technological structure
Framework
(fabricated and domesticated) for biological and
Human ecosystem theory does not yet have a cophysical structure. (2) Historical Canalization: the
herent theoretical framework or structure. Relastrong (though not exclusive) role of the past in
determining historical trajectories (Figure 12). tionships between conceptual devices still need to
Fundamental structural change is difficult because, be laid out. Only a beginning has been made at
among other reasons, an increasingly architectured working out assumptions, theoretical constraints
(technosubstituted) output environment domi- and the conceptual inputs and outputs for theonates the informational input environments. In- retical models. Some basic requirements for framesular logics, taboos and voluntary blinders also play work development have been identified, however.
a role. (3) Seeking the Supernatural: ubiquitous For one, the theoretical framework must be open,
among human systems, at least for the past 30,000 making integration with other existing and evolvyears, human relations with the supernatural (in- ing ecological and anthropological theory possible.
formational, material and energetic) cannot be ig- For another, the scope of the theory must take into
nored in an integrated or holistic understanding account several thousand years of human sociocultural evolution.
of human ecosystems.
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Domain
The minimal domains of inquiry for a comprehensive theory of human ecosystems includes hunting and gathering systems (late Pleistocene and
early Holocene); horticultural based systems;
wood-fuel based ancient states and empires, fossilfuel nation-states (first to early second industrial
revolution; modernity) and the post-WWII world
system.
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ing of human ecosystems is a prerequisite for effective biological and cultural conservation efforts
worldwide.
Other applications and their translation
modes are political in nature. In the past, social
revolutions, civil rights, and liberation movements
have all depended on increased public understanding of the nature of the social systems they lived in
(see Wallerstein 1999:19-33 for specific examples).
Conversely, advances in understanding the nature
Translation Modes
of human ecosystems might give political control
The application of theoretical frameworks to the advantages to unintended agents (cf. Davis 1984,
complexities of the ‘real-world’ can help identify an example of governmental use of social science
errors of abstraction and idealization, making it a techniques in policing efforts).
most useful and sometimes indispensable step in
the development of theory. Forrester (1969) pro- C. ONTOGENY OF HUMAN
vides an illustrative example of the potential of
ECOSYSTEM THEORY
applying theoretical models to aid understanding
of real-world problems. In the late 1960s at MIT
he participated in a series of informal discussions We are at the intuitive stage of theory development
with John Collins, a former mayor of Boston, and for human ecosystems (see Figure 9 and Box 3).
others, exploring the applications of his research Some progress has been made in developing defion the dynamics of complex systems to modeling nitions and basic concepts. The empirical content
pressing urban dilemmas of the time. Not only did is largely descriptive and unconsolidated. Models
he find that the concepts and modeling framework are just beginning to be developed. Framework is
that he had developed were applicable to urban incipient.
It is possible that most of the components for
problems, but that the interaction with people intimately concerned with the inner workings of this a useful theory of human ecosystems already exist.
human ecosystem confirmed generalizations and If so, these components are widely dispersed among
generated new hypotheses about complex systems many different disciplines. The challenge is to bring
in general. For example, complex systems are usu- these components together in the development of
ally counterintuitive and complex human systems theory. How this is done depends on the relations
stubbornly resist top-down policy changes of human ecology to the broader intellectual community and the public at large.
(Forrester 1969:109).
The application of human ecology theory to
management goals (cf. Hens et al. 1998) may yield D. ECOLOGICAL
fruitful insight into the causal effectiveness of conUNDERSTANDING AND THE
scious purpose in system evolution. Bateson
INTELLECTUAL
(1972:31) noted the need for “a formal descripCOMMUNITY AT LARGE
tion of the ways in which human planning and
applied science tend to generate pathology in the
society or in the ecosystem or in the individual.” Developing a theory of human ecosystems is more
Research taboos may be most easily identified in than impractical. It is taboo.
this phase of application and testing, as restrictions
on the acceptability of overly negative or hopeless Practically Impossible?
conclusions about human systems become appar- Pass the buck. Some other discipline should be reent when presented to the public. Real understand- sponsible. Not mine. Certainly not me. I don’t have
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the knowledge required for such a monumental task.
Understanding human ecosystems requires
radical synthesis. It requires an integration of
knowledge and perhaps social discipline previously
limited to warfare. It requires creativity previously
limited to practitioners of the arts and humanities. Development of a working theory of human
ecosystems may take hundreds if not thousands of
years.
True, a diversity of expertise is needed. True,
you can’t have empirical holism in the sense that
all of the details are included in a model with the
aim of understanding the ecosystem. But conceptual holism is possible. Increased understandings
plausibly follow on attempts at holistic
conceptualization.
In our capitalist/postmodern world, understanding of social phenomena as holistic systems
processes with a central informational component
is perhaps most developed in economics. The global economy is commonly referred to as a system
with hierarchical structure (local/regional economic
subsystems), flows (both material and informational), and varied inputs and outputs. For example, a practically possible model for the initial
development of human ecosystem theory is apparent in the analysis of the recent so-called Asian Financial Crisis. The role of panic in precipitating
economic collapse was recognized in media coverage, though the speculation and financial manipulations underlying the panic remained primarily
as subtext, while geopolitics remained sub-subtext
(Wallerstein 1999:49). A world systems perspective reveals cyclical predatory trends in the relations between First World economies and Third
World economies. The former speculates in ‘development’ of emerging economies and newly
opened labor markets (but pull out when that seems
more advantageous), while the latter is increasingly
bound and controlled by debt restrictions (and
deals with the psychological, cultural and social
repercussions of collapse).14 This system is supported by international infrastructures largely con14
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trolled by First World institutions (IMF, WTO,
World Bank) that lend capital to emerging economies in return for de facto control of profitable sectors of the political economy.
Understanding human ecosystems at this level
is clearly a task that requires contributions from a
wide range of disciplines. It requires intellectual
team-work.

Taboo?

Human systems resist and prohibit complete disclosure of how they actually work. It may be intellectually taboo to ask certain questions about the
system. For example, can we include questions
about basic human/system factors such as military
influence in models of current human ecosystems?
Part of the ancient regime, the military is one
of the defining institutions of civilization, setting
paradoxical standards for the emerging cultural
concept of efficiency (e.g., mass destruction), and
expanding the realm of the supernatural (e.g.,
nuclear winter). Wilkinson’s Principle (Figure 17
and text above) recognizes that nation-states exist
within the framework of competing interaction
with ‘foreign’ enemies. Enemies must be created at
the level of the nation-state in order for civilization to exist.
The influence of the military on the development and maintenance of modern civilizations is
generally unacknowledged. What is apparent is that
in warfare the military system pushes the limits of
social organization. It also pushes the limits of technology. But what of its role or influence in ‘peace
time’? There may be a liberal taboo on investigating the connection between the military and social organization in ‘peace time,’ but it is clear that
the contributions of the military-industrial complex are important in organizing and training leadership (McKinlay and Starkey 1998) that maintains the social hierarchy. Technological hand-medowns in ‘peace time’ also contribute to reinforcing patterns within the general cultural system (e.g.,
cell-phones, e-mail, GPS).

After pressure from the International Monetary Fund prompted Indonesian General Suharto’s resignation in 1998 (he
is estimated to have taken $16 billion with him), his successor President Habibie called for the Indonesian people to
work together to overcome the country’s economic crisis. He called on them to conserve scarce resources by fasting
on Mondays and Thursdays of every week (Galeano 2000:177).
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These influences are not accurately reflected
in the energy flow models of modern nation-states.
Indirect informational effects are dominant in the
unconsciousness of ‘peace time.’ But even recognizing topical taboos helps us understand the nature of the system. It might be suggested that the
extent of totalitarian control in our ecosystems can
be measured in part by the thoroughness of taboo
on investigating the role of the military. Institutional secrecy and strategic exclusion of certain
kinds of system information requires methodology that exposes system structure, relations and
histories. For this task a postmodern methodology
may be prescribed as the most effective so far at
identifying taboos and exposing hidden patterns
and assumptions.
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among the Maring (Figure 1e). The boldness of
his accomplishment was in combining native and
academic views of major human ecosystem components in a cybernetic model. Whether the system is (was) cybernetic is open to question. We are
some distance from understanding the manner and
degree to which human ecosystems are self-regulating.
In this essay we have laid out a prelude to a
theory of human ecosystems that is still at the intuitive stage of development (Figure 9). We have
emphasized comparatively simple conceptual
themes, particularly the importance of including
information, belief systems, worldviews and pursuit of the supernatural in our understandings of
human ecosystems. Rappaport’s model not only
includes the supernatural, but also the cycle of warfare and peace, linked to the economic system. We
E. BACK TO THE BEGINNING
propose that a similar systems approach is necessary to understand not only ‘traditional’ small-scale
As an ending to this Prelude to Human Ecosys- societies, but the global postmodern world as well.
tems we should return to Rappaport’s (1971, 1984) It is up to future generations to break the taboos that
model of ritual regulation and ecosystem function prevent the development of such understanding.
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Appendix
The Six Thinking Hats Method
Notes from de Bono 1990b
De Bono’s six thinking hats method is designed to switch thinking away from the normal argumentative style to a mapmaking style. The purpose of the hats is to unscramble thinking so that one is able to
use one thinking mode at a time, alternating them in a constructive way. The six thinking hats do not
cover every possible aspect of thinking, only the main modes.
The idiom of the hats is very artificial. This is its greatest value. The hats provide an innocent
formality, a naïve convenience for requesting a certain type of thinking, either of oneself or of others. In
social contexts, where teamwork is important, they establish some rules for the game of thinking; all the
team players are aware of these rules. The more the hats are used, the more they become part of the
team thinking-culture. Focused thinking becomes much more effective, a brisk and disciplined approach instead of wasting time in argument and pointless talk around the topic of discussion. Without
the formality of the hats, some participants may remain permanently stuck in one mode of thinking,
usually the black hat mode.
At first you may feel a bit awkward using the different hats, but that soon passes as the possibilities
of the system become apparent.
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Black Hat
Devil’s advocate, negative assessment, why it won’t work. What is wrong, doesn’t fit, incorrect, risky,
dangerous, in error. Negative questions, not argument.
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Red Hat
Seeing red and sharing euphoria, making “feelings” visible. Stating values, but not trying to justify
them, nor attempting to make them logical. Also sharing complex judgements such as hunches, intuitions, senses of, and aesthetic tastes.
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White Hat
Lab coat, facts, figures, probabilities, tightening-up questions, checking and re-checking, striving for
objectivity, specifications of limits to knowledge.
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Yellow Hat
Sunshine, optimism, positive opportunity seeking, constructive logical assessment, concrete proposals.
Sharing dreams, visions and hopes. Probing for value and benefit. Making things happen.
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Green Hat
Fertile, creative, lateral thinking. Suspending critical judgement. Searching for alternatives. Going beyond the known, the obvious and the satisfactory. No justification needed. Provocative patterns of
thought and movement of ideas are the goals; symbolized by the word po, the laxative of language, the
opposite of no.
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Blue Hat
Cool thinking from the control tower. Monitoring and coordinating. Organizing the thinking. Setting
the focus. Defining the problems. Shaping the tasks. Providing summaries, overviews and conclusions.
Thinking about thinking. Enforcing the discipline. Calling forth the hats.
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